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Background: We analyse Gordon’s trade-off by adapting Thurow’s approach of pure public good using the
example of the German energy sector which is in a transition process to a low-carbon sustainable energy system
(Energiewende). The income distribution and the energy expenditures of households are interpreted as public
goods. Their distribution is measured with the Atkinson index, which determines how the quality of life, as
measured in income and energy expenditures, is distributed among society.
Methods: We use the disaggregated consumption and income for 39.409 million German households. Our socio-
economic analysis focuses on six household types.
Results: Our analysis shows that among German households, energy expenditures are more equally distributed
than private consumption in general and income. The rather (but by far not completely) equal distribution of
energy expenditures confirms Smil’s finding that energy is the universal currency (Sen, On Economic Inequality,
1973) for people’s welfare and can be seen as an indicator of the basic needs of households irrespective of
household income. Nevertheless, low-income households have to spend a higher share of their income on energy
to avoid energy poverty. Further price increases could lead to an unequal distribution and rising energy poverty.
Conclusions: The socio‐economic conditions of society and its energy sector have to be addressed in a transition
processes. Energy poverty constitutes an infringement of the sustainability concept. If society does not take
distributional effects into account, the transition process itself could be jeopardized.
Keywords: Gordon’s trade‐off, Public goods, Atkinson index, Sustainable energy systemBackground
Sustainable development is a process in which society
and political decision makers have to balance ecological,
economic, and social targets. Equal rights and equality
in terms of “equivalent living conditions” (Article 74
German constitutional law) are key elements of the
social pillar of sustainability.Gordon’s trade-off
Modern societies are confronted with Gordon’s1 trade-
off [14], that is to say, their democratic constitutions
guarantee all citizens the same political rights and obli-
gations [27]. However, this democratic guarantee of* Correspondence: h.schloer@fz-juelich.de
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[14, 29]. Individuals have the same political rights, but
their social participation opportunities correlate not only
with these rights but also with their individual success in
economic processes [7, 14]. Individuals are affected by
two institutions—economic market processes and the
constitution—which grant different positions in society
according to their specific institutional rules.2 The con-
stitutions of democratic systems grant their citizens
rights without any preconditions, whereas their position
within the economic market system is based on their
success in this system [27]. Economic institutions can
“generate substantial disparities among citizens in living
standards and material welfare [14].”is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
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Table 1 Classification of goods
Exclusion
Yes No
Rivalry Yes Pure private good Impure public good
No Club good Pure public good
Source: D. Brümmerhoff, [10]
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one hand, confronted with and have to manage a socio-
economic democratic system that guarantees the same
rights to each individual without any preconditions, and on
the other hand, with an economic system in which individ-
ual success is based mainly on individual performance. So-
ciety and its government have to find a way to balance the
trade-off between these two principles to avoid political
tensions between social groups and households, because of
the trade-off between the conflicting principles of society’s
democratic institutions and those of the economic market
system: “At some points along the way, society confronts
choices that offer somewhat more equality at the expense
of efficiency or somewhat more efficiency at the expense of
equality. In the idiom of the economist, a trade-off emerges
between equality and efficiency [14].” Political projects such
as the German Energiewende can be implemented more
easily if social justice is taken into account, i.e. the distribu-
tion of the material welfare of society [26].
Hence, we can summarize that Gordon’s trade-off is the
result of the relations between two competing institutions
(the democratic system and the economic market system).
This competition is confirmed by Stiglitz, who illustrates
that these conflicts arising from the trade-off are not the
“result of the forces of nature, of abstract forces. [They
are] the result of government policies that shape and dir-
ect the forces of technology and markets and broader so-
cietal forces [36].” In other words, Gordon’s trade-off is
politically shapeable by the institutions of society and has
to be analysed so that this management process can avoid
mismanagement on the basis of flawed data.
The need for such an analysis is also stressed by Ace-
moglu and Robinson [1], who argue “that economic ana-
lysis needs to identify, theoretically and empirically,
conditions under which politics and economics run into
conflict, and then evaluate policy proposals taking this
conflict and the potential backlashes it creates into ac-
count [2].” These conflicts could endanger policy con-
ceptions such as the German energy transition [13].
Our analysis tries to reveal societal obstacles in the
socio-economic conditions of society which have to be
addressed in transition processes and will show the ne-
cessity of political discourse concerning Gordon’s trade-
off, because transition processes are not only technical
problems but increasingly also socio-economic problems
that have to be solved. No one in society can escape
from these unsolved problems. Hence, we will analyse
Gordon’s trade-off in the context of Thurow’s theory of
public goods.
Thurow—distribution of public goods
Private and public goods
The idea of public goods was developed in 1954 by
Samuelson in his paper “The Pure Theory of PublicExpenditure” [23]. He explains the characteristics of a
public good: “that each individual's consumption of
such a good leads to no subtraction from any other
individual's consumption of that good [23].” Public
goods “can be enjoyed by everyone and from which
no one can be excluded [24].” Hence, we can classify
the private and public goods consumed by households
[10] and needed for the well-being of households [17]
into four major categories [10] (Table 1).
In the case of private goods, the use of such a good by
one consumer excludes other consumers from consum-
ing it (i.e. food). In contrast, a dike is a pure public good,
because everyone behind it is protected. A club good
[11, 28] refers to, for instance, the use of a gym. If the
monthly fee is paid, everyone in the gym may use the
equipment. A congested road is an impure public
good—no one can be excluded from the use of the road,
but there will be rivalry in using the road in the case of
congestion [17].
Thurow’s public good approach
Income distribution The distribution of income was
already interpreted as a pure public good by Thurow in
1971 [39], because every individual is confronted with
the same distribution of income. No individual can be
excluded from the advantages and disadvantages of a
given distribution of income, and there is also non-
rivalry in the consumption of the advantages and disad-
vantages [37, 40] of a given distribution of income [39].
Every individual is confronted with the same distribution
of income, because as Joseph Stiglitz explains: “Widely
unequal societies do not function efficiently and their
economies are neither stable nor sustainable … there
comes a point when inequality spirals into economic
dysfunction for the whole society [37].” Everyone needs
a functioning society to sustain their social position [37].
That is to say, the distribution of income is a pure public
good [39] which sustains the functioning of society. It
functions like a dike to stabilize the socio-economic
system.
Energy distribution We will enlarge Thurow’s approach
of a public good by interpreting not only the income dis-
tribution of German households but also the distribution
of their energy expenses as a public good, because the
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important factor in the success of any country’s econ-
omy. The energy system is a dike for the socio-economic
system which needs a competitive infrastructure. We
therefore also interpreted the performance of the energy
system as a public good for society, because no individ-
ual can be excluded from the advantages or disadvan-
tages of the energy system and there is also non-rivalry
in the consumption of the advantages or disadvantages
of the energy system.
Hence, we will expand Thurow’s idea of a pure public
good by including household energy consumption as a
parameter for the quality of the German energy system.
In the following, the distribution of the two public good-
s—income and energy system—will be analysed with the
Atkinson index on the basis of the German household
expenditure survey (EVS) database.
Methods
Atkinson index
The index is based on social theories [5] and regards so-
ciety as “a cooperative project for the mutual [5]” benefit
of all members of society.
The Atkinson index is a normative distribution meas-
ure. The index is based on a social welfare function,
which implies diminishing marginal utility of income [5,
15]. The index thereby assumes additive social welfare,
which is the sum of the individual utility of society
members. This concept is based on utilitarian individual
philosophy [15]. In this philosophy, the welfare of the
other members of society is not part of the individual
utility function [5]: Each individual simply maximizes his
own utility and does not care about the other individ-
uals. The welfare of the individual is measured inde-
pendently of the income of other individuals [5, 15].
Hence, the level of possible energy consumption is based
on the net income, and energy consumption is part of
the social welfare function (SWF), as the following defin-
ition of the welfare function shows:
SWF ¼
Xn
i¼1
UðY ðPC ECÞi
 
; Y ¼ income;
U ¼ utility level; n ¼ number of households
EC ¼ energy consumption;
PC ¼ total private consumption
ð1Þ
In our theoretical approach (utilitarianism), an “out-
side observer” has to compare the individual members
of society with each other. His instrument is the At-
kinson index [15]. The Atkinson index calculates how
society can assess the distribution of individual in-
come and consumption expenditures between thedifferent income classes of the social groups.3 The
index defines maximum inequality with 1 and max-
imum equality with 0 [26] and fulfils six mathematical
axioms thus allowing it to measure inequality [26].
The Atkinson index has a specific feature for calculat-
ing distribution, namely the epsilon parameter ε [3, 4].
The epsilon parameter of Eq. (1) “defines how sensi-
tively the Atkinson index should interpret inequalities
[25].” The value ranges from zero to infinity. If society
does not give any consideration to the distribution of
income, then the value is zero (low inequality aversion).
If society cares only about the lowest income group,
then the value moves towards infinity (high inequality
aversion).4 “The larger epsilon is, the more strongly the
Atkinson index reacts to inequalities [27].” Epsilon can
therefore represent the inequality aversion of society
and can be interpreted as the mathematical parameter
of Gordon’s trade-off.
Gordon0s Trade‐off ¼ Social Equity
Economic Efficiency
¼ Inequality Aversion
¼ Epsilon Parameter of
Atkinson Index
ð2Þ
With the determination of the epsilon parameter, Gor-
don’s trade-off becomes measurable by the Atkinson
index. Epsilon relates two institutions to each other: the
societal trade-off between social equality based on a
democratic constitution and market economic efficiency.
Researchers, social stakeholders, or legislators can define
the social meaning of inequality for socio-economic de-
velopment and can define Gordon’s trade-off by the ep-
silon parameter. In a political discourse, society can
develop a social view of its own understanding of how
individuals treat and see each other in society which can
also be expressed in the tax system. Epsilon confronts a
society with its self-assessment as a just, fair society but
also as an efficient market economy [25, 27].
We use the Atkinson index to determine the distribu-
tional effect of gross income, net income, private con-
sumption, and energy expenditures [3]. The value of the
Atkinson index is Thurow’s public good. It defines the
distribution of income and energy expenditure and the
shape of the dike which prevents economic and social
distortions of the socio-economic system.
For our analysis, we use the modified Atkinson index
(AIXtype) to analyse the inequality of these issues:
AIXtype ¼ 1−
Xn
i¼1
Xi;typeX type
 1−ε
f i;type
" # 1
1−ε
; X
¼ YG;YN ; PC; E; EK ; EW ; for ε≠1:
ð3Þ
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Xn
i¼1
f i;type logeXi;typeX type
" #
; X
¼ YG;YN ; PC; E; EK ; EW ; f or ε ¼ 1 ð4Þ
YGi;type represents gross income of individuals, Y
N
i;type
the net income of individuals, PCi,type consumption ex-
penditure, Ei,type energy consumption expenditure, EWi,-
type residential energy consumption expenditure, EKi,type
car energy consumption expenditure in the ith income
range (n sum of the income classes) in the household
type (singles, singles with child(ren), couples, couples
without child(ren), couples with child(ren)), fi,type is the
proportion of the population in the particular household
type with income in the ith income range, X type is the
mean household value for six income and expenditure
issues (YG, YN, K, E, EK, EW) of the household types,
and the epsilon parameter (ε) is the same for all groups.
Database—German household expenditure survey data
The German household expenditure survey (EVS) pro-
vides data sets on German economic life and the con-
sumer behaviour of private households [34]. Every 5 years,
the Federal Statistical Office questions a selection of
German households (0.2% of all German households)
about their income, expenditures, assets, consumer goods,
and residential situation. The 2008 survey was the tenth
survey, following surveys in 1962/63, 1969, 1973, 1978,
1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 [16, 35]. The EVS for 2008
was published in 2011 [31, 32]. The EVS for 2013 was not
published in 2015. The EVS data sets provide an overview
of the social conditions and socio-economic development
of the population in Germany. The data sets are important
not only for German social politics but also for all other
socio-economic fields of politics [33].
Private households are the central object of investiga-
tion in the framework of the EVS.
Our analysis focuses on the following household types:
1. Single households
2. Single households with child(ren)
3. Couples
4. Couples without child(ren)
5. Couples with child(ren)
6. Other households5
In our model, we consider all 39.409 million house-
holds which took part in the EVS survey, of which
15.537 million (30.1%) are single households, 1.339 mil-
lion are single households with child(ren) (2.6%), and
17.381 million are couples (33.7%) living in one house-
hold, while 11.441 million of the couples households
have no children (22.2%) and 5.940 million of the cou-
ples households have child(ren) (11.5%). We alsoconsider the 5.152 million as other households (“sonstige
Haushalte”).
The following table shows how German households
are distributed among social groups and income groups.
We analyse nine income classes as Table 2 shows.
The table shows the distribution of the households
over the nine income classes. The relatively largest
group of all households (25.8%) is the income class €
2600–€ 3600, whereas within the single households, the
income class € 900–€ 1300 has the largest relative pro-
portion (22%). Within the single households with chil-
d(ren), the largest relative grouping (26.1%) is the
income class € 1500–€ 2000, while couples have the big-
gest share (25.1%) in the income class of € 2600–€ 3600
and couples without children have the highest share
(24.9%) in the income group of € 2600–€ 3600. Couples
with child(ren) have the biggest share (28.4%) in the in-
come group of € 3600–€ 5000. Nearly one third of the
other households (29.3%) belong to the highest income
group (€ 5000–€ 18,000).
Our paper measures the distribution of the public
goods (income distribution and energy system) with the
Atkinson index [3, 4].
In the first step, we analyse the first part of Gordon’s
trade-off, i.e. the success of the household groups in the
economic process, i.e. the income and consumption ex-
penditures of the different household types.
Results
Real distribution
Disposable income of private households according to their
social position
Our analysis is focused on five household types (single
households, single households with child(ren), couples,
couples without child(ren), couples with child(ren)), which
are part of the group of all households. We analyse the
real distribution of income, of consumption, and of energy
expenses. In the first step, we analyse the dispersion of in-
come [12, 18–21, 38], consumption, and energy use. We
define dispersion as the ratio of the income, consumption,
and energy expenditures of the highest income group to
the average household of the social group.
Monthly gross income Couples without children
achieved the highest average monthly gross income in 2008
(€ 9222), followed by other households (€ 9152) and cou-
ples (€ 9136). Singles and couples with child(ren) achieved
nearly the same level of gross income (€ 9083, € 9037),
whereas the gross income of singles with children in the
highest income group is significantly lower (€ 7990).
The dispersion of the gross income varies significantly
between the household types. We can identify three
major groups: The highest dispersion is found in the sin-
gle households group (4.14, 3.43). The second group
Table 2 Distribution of households 2008
Distribution of German households among the different household types and income groups
All Under 900 900–1300 1300–1500 1500–2000 2000–2600 2600–3600 3600–5000 5000–1800
Number of households in 100
Single 15,537 3246 3411 1499 3170 2011 1286 589 325
Single with child(ren) 1339 40 335 157 350 232 136 58 31
Couples 17,381 119 609 504 1862 2883 4363 3742 3299
Couples sine 11,441 103 547 421 1476 2234 2854 2056 1751
Couples with 5940 16 62 82 386 648 1509 1687 1548
Other households 5152 32 159 112 425 541 1020 1354 1509
Total 39,409 3524 4964 2663 7244 8008 10,148 8132 6954
Proportion of the social group in all households in % of total households
Single 39.4 92.1 68.7 56.3 43.8 25.1 12.7 7.2 4.7
Single with child(ren) 3.4 1.1 6.7 5.9 4.8 2.9 1.3 0.7 0.4
Couples 44.1 3.4 12.3 18.9 25.7 36.0 43.0 46.0 47.4
Couples sine 29.0 2.9 11.0 15.8 20.4 27.9 28.1 25.3 25.2
Couples with 15.1 0.5 1.2 3.1 5.3 8.1 14.9 20.7 22.3
Other households 13.1 0.9 3.2 4.2 5.9 6.8 10.1 16.7 21.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Distribution of the households among the different social groups
Single 100 20.9 22.0 9.6 20.4 12.9 8.3 3.8 2.1
Single with child(ren) 100 3.0 25.0 11.7 26.1 17.3 10.2 4.3 2.3
Couples 100 0.7 3.5 2.9 10.7 16.6 25.1 21.5 19.0
Couples sine 100 0.9 4.8 3.7 12.9 19.5 24.9 18.0 15.3
Couples with 100 0.3 1.0 1.4 6.5 10.9 25.4 28.4 26.1
Other households 100 0.6 3.1 2.2 8.2 10.5 19.8 26.3 29.3
Total 100 8.9 12.6 6.8 18.4 20.3 25.8 20.6 17.6
Source: Schlör et al. 2015 [31, 32]
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(1.97, 2.18). The income dispersion reaches its lowest
value in the groups containing couples with child(ren)
and other households (1.66, 1.67) (Table 3).
Monthly net income The monthly net income of pri-
vate households also varies strongly with the social sta-
tus of the main income recipient, as the following table
shows (Table 4).
Couples with children achieved the highest average
monthly net income in 2008 (€ 4191), followed by couples
(€ 3662), couples without child(ren) (€ 3387), and singles
with and without child(ren) (€ 1943, € 1726). The disper-
sion of the net income varies significantly between the
household types. Once again, the first group contains single
households where the dispersion decreases from 4.09 to
3.3. The second group contains couples and couples with-
out child(ren) (1.9, 2.1). They have a significantly lower dis-
persion than the single households. The income dispersion
reaches its lowest value in the group containing couples
with child(ren) and other households (1.6). The comparisonof net and gross income shows that the German income
tax system reduces the dispersion in this particular house-
hold type.
Expenditure of private households according to their social
position
Monthly private consumption Expenditure for private
consumption also varies between the different household
types, as the following Table 5 shows. The single house-
holds spend an average of € 1418 per month, singles with
child(ren) € 1740, couples € 2757, couples without chil-
d(ren) € 2622, couples with child(ren) € 3017, and other
households € 3142. The consumption expenditures increase
with rising income without reaching a saturation point.
The consumption dispersion is significantly lower than the
income dispersion.
The consumption dispersion of singles (2.35) and sin-
gles with child(ren) (2.12) is the highest of all house-
holds analysed, followed by couples (1.53, 1.62, 1.38) and
other households (1.46). Their dispersion is much lower,
Table 3 Gross income 2008
Gross income of private households in Germany 2008 according to their household type
Net income groups in € Single Single with children Couples Couples without children Couples with children Other households
All households 2193 2327 4644 4230 5441 5475
Under 900 780 798 790 483 698 908
900–1300 1275 1186 1250 1242 1326 1274
1300–1500 1747 1545 1608 1611 1592 1607
1500–2000 2285 2051 2044 2037 2070 2069
2000–2600 3022 2841 2738 2696 2882 2832
2600–3600 3953 3740 3833 3742 4004 4007
3600–5000 5463 5376 5475 5415 5548 5526
5000–18,000 9083 7990 9136 9222 9037 9152
Gross income dispersiona 4.14 3.43 1.97 2.18 1.66 1.67
Source: Own calculation based on German Federal Statistical Office, 2011,
aIncome dispersion: Ratio of the gross income of the highest income group to the gross income of the average household of the social group. Italic numbers own estimation
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the single households.
In the following, we analyse the energy expenditures
of the households.
Monthly energy consumption The expenditures for en-
ergy consumption of the households will be analysed in
more detail to obtain a picture of the real distribution of
energy consumption in Germany. This includes car en-
ergy and residential energy expenditures and total en-
ergy expenditures as summarized in Table 6.
Energy expenses for cars Energy expenses for cars in-
clude expenses for fuel and lubricants in the six social
groups. The single households without and with children
spend nearly the same amount (€ 50 and € 67, respectively)
on car energy, whereas the couples without child(ren)
spend on average € 111 and the couples with child(ren) and
couples spend € 150 and € 124, respectively. The otherTable 4 Net income of private households in Germany 2008 accord
Income groups in € Single Single with child(ren) Couples Co
All households 1726 1943 3662 33
Under 900 705 758 759 81
900–1300 1097 1125 1125 11
1300–1500 1396 1394 1407 14
1500–2000 1736 1727 1766 17
2000–2600 2259 2268 2303 22
2600–3600 3028 2984 3073 30
3600–5000 4168 4187 4213 42
5000–18,000 7067 6351 7015 71
Net income dispersiona 4.09 3.3 1.9 2.1
Source: Own calculation based on German Federal Statistical Office, 2011, /=no dec
aIncome dispersion: ratio of the net income of the highest available income grouphouseholds have on average the highest expenditures on
car energy: € 160. With rising income, expenses for car en-
ergy increase continuously without reaching a saturation
point. The dispersion of energy expenditure between the
household types is significantly lower compared to income
and overall consumption. In the case of car energy expend-
iture, it ranges from 1.18 to 1.94.
Residential energy expenditure With respect to ex-
penses for residential energy, all three couple household
types have nearly the same expenditures for residential en-
ergy (€ 165, € 163, € 169). The single households with chil-
d(ren) (€ 119) have insignificantly higher residential energy
expenditure than all single households (€ 93). The other
households have the highest expenditures for residential
energy, with an average of € 201. With rising income, ex-
penses for residential energy increase continuously, reach-
ing a saturation point before the highest income group only
in the case of singles with child(ren). In the othering to their household type
uples without child(ren) Couples with child(ren) Other households
87 4191 4229
6 854 429
20 1169 1144
08 1402 1407
66 1764 1766
96 2325 2299
48 3120 3112
00 4229 4249
19 6898 6966
1.646 1.647
laration, the number of cases is too small. Italic numbers are own estimation
to the net income of the average household of the social group
Table 5 Private consumption
Private consumption of private households in Germany 2008 according to their household type
Income groups in € Single Single with child(ren) Couples Couples without child(ren) Couples with child(ren) Other households
All households 1418 1740 2757 2622 3017 3142
<900 799 1046 1842 1685 1737 1662
900–1300 1086 1146 1250 1237 1360 1176
1300–1500 1291 1339 1491 1493 1480 1364
1500–2000 1509 1630 1722 1725 1711 1672
2000–2600 1818 2003 2133 2128 2151 2068
2600–3600 2156 2604 2558 2551 2571 2580
3600–5000 2551 3273 3150 3172 3123 3269
5000–18,000 3329 3692 4207 4236 4175 4576
Consumption dispersiona 2.35 2.12 1.53 1.62 1.38 1.46
Source: Own calculation based on German Federal Statistical Office, 2011./= no declaration, the number of cases is too small
aConsumption dispersion: ratio of the consumption of the highest available income group to the consumption of the average household of the social group
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creases without reaching a saturation point. Generally, the
dispersion in the case of residential energy is lower than
that of car energy. All household types show a dispersion
between 1.17 and 1.65.Total energy expenditure When we now sum up the car
and residential energy expenditures to calculate the total
energy expenditures. We see that couples with child(ren) (€
319) have nearly the highest energy expenditures followed
by the other two couple household types (€ 274, € 289),
whereas the two single household types have lower energy
expenditures (€ 143, € 186). The other households have the
highest energy expenditures: € 361.
With rising income, the total energy expenses increase
and reach a saturation point before the highest income
group only in the household type singles with child(ren).
In the other household types, the total energy expendi-
tures increase without reaching a saturation point before
the highest income group.
Hence, the dispersion varies between households. Couple
(1.18, 1.28, 1.33) and single households show a slightly
higher dispersion (1.55, 1.75), whereas the other households
have a dispersion similar to the couple households (1.32).
In the following, we also present the distribution of ex-
penditures for another basic good: food and beverages. The
comparison between food and energy enables us to classify
the energy distribution results.Food consumption The expenditures for food and bev-
erages differ among the households. But the dispersion
of food expenditures is the lowest of all analysed types
of consumption and income (Table 7).
The single households spend on average €182 for food
and beverages. These expenditures reach their saturationpoint at € 222 per month in the highest income class. The
food consumption of singles with children increases on
average by about € 100 to € 281 per month and reaches its
saturation point in the income group of € 3600–5000 (€
366) before the top income group, which consumes less (€
357). The social group of couple households consumes on
average food and beverage for € 400 a month, and this
consumption reaches its highest value in the highest in-
come group with € 486. Couples without children (€ 360,
€ 432) consume on average and in the top group less than
all couples. Food and beverage consumption increases on
average in the social group of couples with children to €
478 a month and in the top income group this rises to €
547. The social group of other households has the highest
monthly food consumption with on average € 483 and in
the top group € 603. The food consumption dispersion for
other households (1.25) and single parents (1.27) is the
highest of all households analysed, followed by couples (1.2,
1.2, 1.14). Couples with children have food consumption
patterns that are more similar than the other households.
Our analysis shows how the household types’ heteroge-
neous levels of success in the economic system may be
measured in income and consumption expenditures.
Discussion
In the following, we examine how the real distribution of
expenses and income is perceived by the households
against the background of differing levels of inequality
aversion within society, i.e. how society assesses the distri-
bution of income and expenditures against their norma-
tive perception of inequality.
Normative distribution
In the following, we examine how the real distribution
of expenses and income is perceived by the households
against the background of differing levels of inequality
Table 6 Energy consumption—car, residential, and total
Energy consumption of private households in Germany 2008 according to their social position
Income groups in € Single Single with child(ren) Couple Couple without child(ren) Couple with child(ren) Other households
Car energy expenditure in €
All households 50 67 124 111 150 160
<900 15 17 78 63 71 29
900–1300 32 33 44 42 67 38
1300–1500 47 51 63 63 58 39
1500–2000 61 70 75 73 80 72
2000–2600 75 89 97 90 120 99
2600–3600 86 101 126 115 148 140
3600–5000 93 108 151 141 163 179
5000–18,000 97 130 169 161 177 225
Car energy dispersiona 1.94 1.94 1.36 1.45 1.18 1.41
Residential energy expenditure in €
All households 93 119 165 163 169 201
<900 69 86 161 140 170 151
900–1300 81 100 111 112 104 104
1300–1500 89 103 109 107 116 118
1500–2000 96 112 130 132 126 140
2000–2600 106 123 148 150 141 154
2600–3600 127 165 161 164 155 180
3600–5000 133 198 184 188 180 219
5000–18,000 153 158 201 203 198 252
Residential energy dispersionb 1.65 1.33 1.22 1.25 1.17 1.25
Total energy expenditure in €
All households 143 186 289 274 319 361
<900 84 103 239 203 241 180
900–1300 113 133 155 154 171 142
1300–1500 136 154 172 170 174 157
1500–2000 157 182 205 205 206 212
2000–2600 181 212 245 240 261 253
2600–3600 213 266 287 279 303 320
3600–5000 226 306 335 329 343 398
5000–18,000 250 288 370 364 375 477
Total energy dispersionc 1.75 1.55 1.28 1.33 1.18 1.32
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, 2010, aresidential energy dispersion: ratio of the residential energy expenditures of the highest income group to the
residential energy expenditure of the average household of the social group
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, 2010, bresidential energy dispersion: ratio of the residential energy expenditures of the highest income group to the
residential energy expenditure of the average household of the social group
Source: Own calculation based on German Federal Statistical Office, 2011, cTotal energy dispersion: ratio of the total energy expenditures of the highest income
group to the total energy expenditure of the average household of the social group
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tribution of income and expenditures against their nor-
mative perception of inequality. In our analysis, the
epsilon parameter of the Atkinson index ranges from 1
to 2.5, whereas (ε = 1, 1.5) represents a low inequality
aversion of society and (ε = 2, 2.5) represents a high in-
equality aversion of German society.Singles
In the case of the single households, the net income
(0.149–0.299) is more equally distributed than the
gross income (0.176–0.356). This illustrates the effect-
iveness of the German tax system in reducing some
of the inequality of the German economic market
system.
Table 7 Food consumption
Food and beverage expenditures of private households in Germany 2008 according to their household type
Net income groups in € Single Single with children Couples Couples without children Couples with children Other households
All households 182 281 400 360 478 483
under 900 148 193 317 289 298 287
900–1300 172 236 276 269 333 266
1300–1500 182 262 289 283 320 313
1500–2000 193 286 328 314 382 331
2000–2600 202 303 359 340 423 369
2600–3600 213 333 396 365 457 446
3600–5000 219 366 435 389 491 514
5000–18,000 222 357 486 433 547 603
Food dispersiona 1.22 1.27 1.22 1.20 1.14 1.25
Source: Own calculation based on German Federal Statistical Office, 2011. Italic numbers own estimation
aFood consumption dispersion: ratio of the food consumption of the highest income group to the food consumption of the average household of the
social group
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are distributed more equally between the households
than the two income types.
In the case of energy consumption, the expenditures
on residential energy (0.023–0.053) are nearly equally
distributed between the households. On the other hand,
the expenditures for car energy are more unequally dis-
tributed in this household group than the gross income
(0.165–0.388). Residential energy expenditures are of
central importance for the households irrespective of
their income, whereas individual mobility (cars) is not
necessarily required by all households. For the single
households, the public transport system is an alternative.
This explains why in the single households the car en-
ergy values of the Atkinson index are higher than the
residential energy. Table 8 shows that “food” is the most
equally distributed (0.006–0.018) item of the analysed
data sample. As expected, food is the main basic good
for single households.
Singles with child(ren)
As in the household groups of all single households, the
net income of single households with child(ren) is moreTable 8 Atkinson index of single households
Atkinson index 2008—singles
Atkinson epsilon Gross income Net income Private consump
Singles
1.0 0.176 0.149 0.066
1.5 0.247 0.208 0.095
2.0 0.307 0.257 0.123
2.5 0.356 0.299 0.149
Source: Own calculations 2016
aCar energy = fuel and lubricants
bFood, beverages (non-alcohol and alcohol), and tobaccoequally distributed than the gross income. The data con-
firms that the German tax system evens out the inequal-
ities of the economic market system to some extent. The
gross income of single households with child(ren) is
more unequally distributed (0.125–0.258) than the in-
come of the group consisting of all single households.
This is also valid for the net income.
We can also see that the distribution of private con-
sumption (0.056–0.121) and of all energy expenditures
(0.038–0.087) is more equal in this household type than
car energy expenditures (0.106–0.262). Table 9 illustrates
that also in this social group food consumption is the
most equally distributed consumption issue.
Couples
In the couple group, the gross income (0.138–0.323) is
again more unequally distributed than the net income
(0.118–0.277) due to the German tax system (Table 10).
This is also valid for the consumption patterns (0.05–
0.124) and energy expenditures (0.025–0.067). The resi-
dential energy expenditures (0.025–0.034) of this house-
hold group are again the most equally distributed issue
in this household group. The results also show that cartion Energy Residential energy Car energya Foodb
0.055 0.023 0.165 0.006
0.079 0.034 0.246 0.010
0.103 0.044 0.322 0.014
0.125 0.053 0.388 0.018
Table 9 Atkinson index of single households with child(ren)
Atkinson index 2008—singles with child(ren)
Atkinson epsilon Gross income Net income Private consumption Energy Residential energy Car energya Foodb
Singles with child(ren)
1.0 0.125 0.098 0.056 0.038 0.018 0.106 0.011
1.5 0.176 0.138 0.080 0.055 0.027 0.158 0.016
2.0 0.220 0.172 0.102 0.071 0.035 0.210 0.021
2.5 0.258 0.202 0.121 0.087 0.043 0.262 0.027
Source: Own calculations 2016
aCar energy = fuel and lubricants
bFood, beverages (non-alcohol and alcohol), and tobacco
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distributed than residential energy expenditures but
more equally distributed than in the case of single
households. Food consumption is distributed in the
same way in the couple households (0.011–0.038) as in
the single households with children.Couples without child(ren)
In the case of the gross and net income, we see again
that, because of the tax system, the net income (0.124–
0.355) is more equally distributed than the gross income
(0.150–0.355). We can assert that residential energy
(0.017–0.041) is again the most equally distributed good.
Private consumption (0.053–0.128) is distributed in a
manner similar to car energy (0.057–0.148), and a little
more unequally than energy expenditures.
The food consumption of the couple households with
children (0.008–0.020) is more equally distributed than
that of all couples. Table 11 also documents the basic
need character of food consumption, because it is the
most equally distributed good of these households.Couples with child(ren)
The effects of the German tax system as an instrument
to reduce income inequality can also be confirmed by
the analysis of the gross (0.104–0.267) and net income
(0.091–0.227) of couples with children (Table 12).Table 10 Atkinson index of all couples households
Atkinson index 2008—all couples
Atkinson epsilon Gross income Net income Private consump
All couples
1.0 0.138 0.118 0.050
1.5 0.204 0.174 0.075
2.0 0.266 0.227 0.100
2.5 0.323 0.277 0.124
Source: Own calculations 2016
aCar energy = fuel and lubricants
bFood, beverages (non-alcohol and alcohol), and tobaccoPrivate consumption in this household group is rela-
tively equally distributed. But the results show that car
energy expenditures are also equally distributed and we
can see a clear contrast to the single households, where
car energy expenditures are distributed very unequally.
We can conclude from this that car energy expenditures
are not necessarily an essential good for single house-
holds, but for the couples, especially for those with chil-
dren, they are indispensable. In the households of
couples with children, food consumption is also very
equally distributed, and the Atkinson index (0.007–
0.018) is a good indicator of that.
Other households
The final household type in our analysis is the group
containing other households. This household group also
confirms the effects of the German tax system, which re-
duces income inequality between the members of that
household type (0.176–0.337 to 0.149–0.326).
Table 13 shows that the inequality assessed by the modi-
fied Atkinson index increases with rising epsilon irrespect-
ive of which issue is analysed. The energy expenditures
(0.048–0.133) of that group are more equally distributed
than the overall private consumption (0.065–0.167). The
residential energy expenditures (0.024–0.069) are more
equally distributed than the car energy expenditures
(0.030–0.129). Food consumption is more unequally dis-
tributed in the group of all other households than in thetion Energy Residential energy Car energya Foodb
0.025 0.015 0.047 0.011
0.039 0.022 0.076 0.016
0.053 0.029 0.106 0.022
0.067 0.037 0.139 0.038
Table 11 Atkinson index of couples without child(ren)
Atkinson index 2008—couples without child(ren)
Atkinson epsilon Gross income Net income Private consumption Energy Residential energy Car energya Foodb
Couples without child(ren)
1.0 0.150 0.124 0.053 0.030 0.017 0.057 0.008
1.5 0.221 0.180 0.079 0.044 0.025 0.086 0.012
2.0 0.288 0.231 0.104 0.058 0.033 0.116 0.016
2.5 0.355 0.278 0.128 0.073 0.041 0.148 0.020
Source: Own calculations 2016
aCar energy = fuel and lubricants
bFood, beverages (non-alcohol and alcohol), and tobacco
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(0.025–0.065) are near the values of the residential energy.
The other households group, which includes, for example,
parents-in-law, children over 18 and groups sharing an
apartment, is more heterogeneous than the single and
couple households, which explains the higher Atkinson
index.
Conclusions
Summary
We can therefore summarize that the household group
of couples with child(ren) is the most homogeneous
group and that their net income is more equally distrib-
uted than their gross income. Private consumption is
more equally distributed than both income types, and
energy services are distributed almost equally between
the household types. However, the single households are
the most heterogeneous household group and show a
more differentiated distribution picture than the couple
households. In both single household types, the German
tax system significantly reduces the inequality between
households. In the case of epsilon 2.5—representing a
high inequality aversion—the German tax system re-
duces the Atkinson index of single households from
0.356 to 0.299. But also in the single households, private
consumption is more equally distributed than income,
and energy expenditures are still the most equally dis-
tributed expenditure type (0.055–0.125). What is strikingTable 12 Atkinson index of couples with child(ren)
Atkinson index 2008—couples with child(ren)
Atkinson epsilon Gross income Net income Private consump
Couples with child(ren)
1.0 0.104 0.091 0.039
1.5 0.157 0.137 0.058
2.0 0.212 0.183 0.078
2.5 0.267 0.227 0.098
Source: Own calculations 2016
aCar energy = fuel and lubricants
bFood, beverages (non-alcohol and alcohol), and tobaccoin this group is the fact that car energy expenditures are
the most unevenly distributed expenditure type. We
have seen that energy expenditures are more equally dis-
tributed than private consumption and income types.
The nearly equal distribution of energy expenditures
confirms Smil’s assumption that energy is the universal
currency [30] for people’s welfare and can be seen as an
indicator of the basic needs of the households, whereby
“basic” means something different in different coun-
tries—for Germany basic needs means an energy con-
sumption which offers social participation. These basic
energy needs are to a large extent, but not completely,
independent of people’s income situation.
This means that the lower income groups have to
spend a very high percentage of their income on energy
services compared to the higher income groups
(Table 14). Households with a net income lower than €
900 are divided into two major groups. The singles in
this income group spend between 11.9 and 13.6% of
their income on energy services. They spend between 3
and 4 basis points more than the average household in
this social group and nearly 10 basis points more than
the highest income group.
However, we get a different picture in the social group
of couples households: the couple households of the in-
come group <€ 900 spend more than 25% of their net
income on energy services. Rising energy prices would
affect these households directly. In this case, they wouldtion Energy Residential energy Foodb Car energya
0.016 0.012 0.007 0.025
0.024 0.017 0.010 0.040
0.034 0.023 0.014 0.059
0.045 0.029 0.018 0.080
Table 13 Atkinson index of other households
Atkinson index 2008—other households
Atkinson epsilon Gross income Net income Private consumption Energy Residential energy Car energya Foodb
Other households
1.0 0.176 0.149 0.065 0.048 0.024 0.094 0.025
1.5 0.202 0.185 0.074 0.099 0.039 0.151 0.038
2.0 0.271 0.254 0.103 0.133 0.053 0.216 0.051
2.5 0.337 0.326 0.133 0.167 0.069 0.286 0.065
Source: Own calculations 2016
aCar energy = fuel and lubricants
bFood, beverages (non-alcohol and alcohol), and tobacco
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budgets. They would have to reduce other expenditures
to maintain their use of energy services at its current
level; otherwise, they would lose access to modern en-
ergy services which are “crucial to human well-being
and to a country’s economic development” as the IEA
stated. There is a danger that these households will be
confronted with energy poverty, which can be defined as
a “condition wherein a household is unable to access en-
ergy services [8]” at its accustomed level, and so there is
a growing need for energy governance. Energy poverty
constitutes an infringement of the sustainability concept:
environmental, economic, and social targets have to be
balanced in the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Outlook
Our analysis reveals that energy poverty and the socio-
economic conditions of society and its energy sector have
to be addressed in transition processes to a sustainable so-
ciety and have to be at the centre of any energy transition
process and its political discourse. The analysis of
Gordon’s trade-off shows that transition processes such as
the German Energiewende are not only technical prob-
lems but increasingly also socio-economic problems that
have to be solved by energy governance [6], and becauseTable 14 Energy consumption of private households in relation to ne
Income groups in € Singles Singles with child(ren) Couples Co
All households 8.3 9.6 7.9 8.1
<900 11.9 13.6 31.5 24.
900–1300 10.3 11.8 13.8 13.
1300–1500 9.7 11.0 12.2 12.
1500–2000 9.0 10.5 11.6 11.
2000–2600 8.0 9.3 10.6 10.
2600–3600 7.0 8.9 9.3 9.2
3600–5000 5.4 7.3 8.0 7.8
5000–18,000 3.5 4.5 5.3 5.1
Source: Own calculation based on German Federal Statistical Office, 2011. Italic num
*Total energy dispersion: ratio of the total energy expenditures of the highest incom
social groupof Thurow’s public good approach, no one in society can
escape from the unsolved problems of Gordon’s trade-off.
The analysis using the Atkinson index can reveal dee-
per insights into the self-perception of society and the
conception of justice and equality, which are central pil-
lars of a sustainable society. The epsilon parameter
thereby enables us to parameterize this perception and
conception in measuring the distribution of consump-
tion and income. Our analysis is necessary, because
every economic and political reform has distributional
effects. If politicians do not consider these effects (en-
ergy poverty), they can endanger the total reform of the
energy sector (Energiewende), because people will turn
away from the goals of the reform [1, 9]. Acceptance of
reforms such as the German Energiewende will thus
decline.
The transformation of current energy systems into
sustainable systems is on the agenda of all European
countries (EU climate policy). Therefore, such a trans-
formation could (and probably will) also lead to rising
electricity prices, placing an above-average strain on the
lowest income groups. Moreover, this regressive effect
will appear in all categories of expenditure if prices
increase, no matter whether this is caused by political
decisions or market forces.t income* Germany 2008 according to their social position—in %
uples without child(ren) Couples with child(ren) Other households
7.6 8.5
9 28.2 42.0
8 14.6 12.4
1 12.4 11.2
6 11.7 12.0
5 11.2 11.0
9.7 10.3
8.1 9.4
5.4 6.8
bers: own estimation, limited data basis in this income group
e group to the total energy expenditures of the average household of the
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spect to energy and other household expenditures, if the re-
spective national statistical office provides the necessary
household survey data for the analysis. Our index can then
provide decision makers and institutions with information
on how (un)equally the costs of transformation processes
are distributed between the different income groups. We
used energy in our analysis because it is one of the basic
needs, and the energy sector is at the centre of the German
transformation process: the Energiewende. Energy poverty
caused by the Energiewende—as a synonym for a lack of
societal participation in the transformation process, at least
in highly developed countries—can endanger the whole
transformation process. Political strategies to strengthen
participation should therefore focus on the regressive effect
of high energy prices.
Decision makers and political institutions can decide
in a public discourse which categories of expenditures
should be analysed and which are more important and
relevant to justify political interventions to reduce the
inequality caused by rising prices.
The index could also deliver information about the dif-
ferences in income distribution in EU countries. For this
analysis, we need reliable and comparable statistical data
for the whole of Europe. However, in our view, two im-
portant political obstacles are looming: Firstly, it is diffi-
cult enough to find common political ground in domestic
policy between the different political actors and interest
groups in order to distribute the costs of national trans-
formation policies. Secondly, this challenge is raised to a
completely different level if wealth is to be redistributed
between EU states (Euro crisis, Greek debt crisis) to a
much larger extent than is the case today (EU Regional
Fund, Structural Fund etc.).
To summarize, our concept has both a detection (re-
vealing the implicit preferences) and potentially also an
orientation function (defining explicit societal prefer-
ences with respect to the degree of homogeneity of a
society).Endnotes
1Kermit Gordon (1916–1976) was Director of the
United States Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of
Management and Budget) (December 28, 1962–June 1,
1965) during the administration of Lyndon Johnson, and
he was also the president of the Brookings Institution.
He oversaw the creation of the first budgets for John-
son’s Great Society domestic agenda. Gordon was a
member of the Council of Economic Advisors, 1961–
1962.
2For our analysis, we take up the definition of an insti-
tution offered by Rawls. Institutions in Rawls’s sense are
the constitution, economic and social conditions,freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, economic
markets with competition, and private property [22].
3Nicholas Barr shows that the Gini coefficient has two
disadvantages for measuring inequality, which are
avoided by the Atkinson index [5]. The Gini coefficient
is not an unambiguous measure because, as Hauser and
Barr have shown, different distributions can lead to the
same Gini coefficient [13, 52]. Hence, we decided to use
the Atkinson index to estimate the distributional effects
of increasing energy prices [27].
4This analytical view is based on Rawls’ theory of just-
ice, where inequality is determined by the “position of
the least advantaged members of society. Where epsilon
lies between these extremes depends on the importance
attached to redistribution towards the bottom [3].”
5Other households include, e.g. parents-in-law, chil-
dren over 18, and groups sharing an apartment.
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